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Abstract—In this paper, we differentiate between a true 
‘Internet of things’ and its component parts. We argue that the 
determining aspect of the ‘Internet of Things’ (IoT) is the 
accessibility of ‘things’ on the global Internet, as opposed to a 
simple interconnection of networked ‘things’. We observe that 
most reported applications of the ‘Internet of Things’ would be 
more accurately described as ‘Intranets of Things’. In large part, 
this is because the owners and operators of AIDC (Automatic 
identification and data capture) systems and sensor networks 
that in the main make up the IoT have understandable concerns 
about the security of their assets and therefore will limit access to 
that which serves their own purposes. In the wider field of the 
Internet ‘in the large’, the open mining of the Web for 
information has become the mainstay of many genres of research, 
allowing the assembly of huge corpora, enabling analytical 
techniques that can reveal far more information than previous 
limited studies. It is argued that part of the expected dividend for 
the IoT is to enable use on a similar scale of sensor and AIDC 
data, and that the results will be availability of information 
fusion on a huge scale, which will allow significant new 
knowledge to be generated. We give an example of how in one 
project, the RFID from Farm to Fork traceability project, this 
prospect has been validated to an extent on the basis that data 
owners voluntarily made their data available on the Web for 
specific purposes. Extrapolating to a more general case, we 
suggest that there are two services that need to be provided in 
order for the generalized information mining that occurs on the 
Internet-at-large to occur in the Internet of Things. The first is a 
means of cataloguing available data, which is already being 
addressed by services such as HyperCAT. The second is an 
automatic rights management service (IoT-RM), which would 
manage the rights and permissions and allow data owners to 
determine in advance to whom their data should be released, for 
what purposes, subject to which restrictions (such as, for 
instance, anonymisation) and whether any remuneration should 
be involved. We make some concrete proposals about the form 
that such an IoT-RM should take. 
Keywords—Internet of Things, Internet of Services, rights 
management, security, information mining. 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
The term ‘Internet of Things’ was originally coined by 
Kevin Ashton of the MIT Auto-ID Center. Writing in RFID 
Journal [1], he remembers first using the term in a presentation 
made to Proctor and Gamble. Explaining his motivation, he 
says: 
Conventional diagrams of the Internet include servers 
and routers and so on, but they leave out the most 
numerous and important routers of all: people. The 
problem is, people have limited time, attention and 
accuracy—all of which means they are not very good at 
capturing data about things in the real world.  
And that's a big deal. We're physical, and so is our 
environment. Our economy, society and survival aren't 
based on ideas or information—they're based on things. 
You can't eat bits, burn them to stay warm or put them in 
your gas tank. Ideas and information are important, but 
things matter much more. Yet today's information 
technology is so dependent on data originated by people 
that our computers know more about ideas than things.  
If we had computers that knew everything there was to 
know about things—using data they gathered without any 
help from us—we would be able to track and count 
everything, and greatly reduce waste, loss and cost. We 
would know when things needed replacing, repairing or 
recalling, and whether they were fresh or past their best.  
We need to empower computers with their own means of 
gathering information, so they can see, hear and smell the 
world for themselves, in all its random glory. 
It’s clear that the original conception had at its core the 
Internet, and furthermore, some developing idea that if this rich 
ecology of ‘things’ could be interconnected, great things would 
happen. This presentation took place in 1999. Since then, 16 
years have passed and while the technology of ‘things’ has 
progressed a great deal, in terms of the available processing 
resource in devices such as sensor nodes and AIDC systems, as 
well as ever more ingenious sensing devices, the Internet of 
Things has not progressed to the extent where computers can 
‘see, hear and smell the world for themselves’. 
To a large extent, this is not a problem of technology. As 
observed above, the computational power of sensor nodes and 
embedded systems in general increases year on year. Further, 
the Internet is by far the cheapest method of interconnection for 
anyone operating a network of sensors and other computational 
resources, which has resulted in many such networks being 
connected to the ultimate user of the data by means of the 
Internet. Thus these devices are already ubiquitous on the 
internet, however rather than making up an ‘Internet of Things’ 
they are configured as a collection of ‘Intranets of Things’, 
with security measures in place expressly to ensure that the 
data they provide is not openly and generally available.  
The purpose of this paper is to consider the organizational 
blocks on the achievement of a true ‘Internet of Things’ as 
originally conceived by Ashton and then to propose an 
additional part of Internet of Things architectures, a component 
concerned with automatic rights management, which we argue 
will provide the technological underpinnings required to allow 
removal of these blocks. We start by reviewing some of the 
potential benefits of information mining in the Internet of 
Things. Subsequently we review the commonly expressed 
security concerns and the technological solutions proposed to 
address them. A specific example of the operation of 
collaborative data sharing and limited consensual data mining 
is examined. The selected example is the RFID from Farm to 
Fork (RFID-F2F) project conducted by a team including two of 
the present authors. The operation of this system depended on 
information mining, but the information providers were 
knowing participants and had provided this information on the 
open Internet just so that it could be mined. To date, much 
activity concerned with enabling ‘thing’ owners to make their 
data available on the Internet has been directed at solving the 
problems of discoverability, particularly with the provision of 
cataloguing services such as HyperCAT [2], so in order to 
provide context for the requirements for rights management, 
these systems are discussed. From this and consideration of the 
RFID-F2F information owners concerns, and the project 
activity required to address them we develop a set of 
requirements for automatic rights management service on the 
Internet of Things (IoT-RM).  
II. INFORMATION MINING THE INTERNET OF THINGS 
The idea of information mining was central to Ashton’s 
original vision. Since then, many reports have reiterated this 
theme, or simply built it implicitly into the justification for the 
work. Such implicit statements are often simply projections of 
the future value of the Internet of Things as a massive 
connection of devices on the Internet without any explicit 
statement on how that interconnection will produce beneficial 
results. A rich seam of such statements is provided by the 
report of the Cluster of Research Projects on the Internet of 
Things [3]. For instance, Santucci quotes Haladjian [4]: 
And men got dreaming. Shouldn't there be a network 
that made all my devices collaborate at all times, converse 
spontaneously among themselves and with the rest of the 
world, and all together make up a kind of single virtual 
computer – the sum of their respective intelligence, 
knowledge and know how? 
While information mining is not explicitly mentioned, the 
notion that a computing device might ‘spontaneously’ reach 
out for information from ‘the rest of the world’ to increase 
‘intelligence, knowledge and know how’ seems very much to 
be what information mining is about.  
Santucci notes that:  
One of the main challenges of the Internet of Things is 
therefore to transform connected objects into real actors of 
the Internet by developing and implementing appropriate 
applicative design methodologies This shift of paradigm 
involves major societal and ethical challenges that loom 
ahead and need to be tackled, certainly at European level 
but also at global level. The metamorphosis of objects, if 
left without any regulation or interference, might give rise 
to a genuine, extensive surveillance society. 
Again, what is clearly implied is the idea that the data from 
devices will be freely accessible on the Internet, and used 
sufficiently widely that this use could be a significant threat to 
personal liberties. 
It seems likely that information mining on the Internet of 
Things will be a rich source of knowledge. It is not an 
outrageous speculation to suggest that a very rich image of 
world trade could be gained by mining information from EPC 
(Electronic Product Code) tags or that data from the 
temperature and air pressure sensors on the Internet could be 
mined to produce a very detailed picture of microclimatic 
conditions. The techniques of information mining can allow 
very powerful derivation from many kinds of data.  This is the 
context within which Barnaghi et. al. discussed the need to 
develop a semantic layer for the Internet of Things [5]. They 
note that: 
… the current initiative on building the IoT (or more 
general, the future Internet) demands application and 
service platforms which can capture, communicate, store, 
access and share data from the physical world. This will 
create new opportunities in a long list of domains such as 
e-health, retail, green energy, manufacturing, smart 
cities/houses and also personalized end-user applications. 
There are already some examples reported of information 
mining type activity over domains that could be included 
within the heading ‘Internet of Things’. Datcu et. al. report 
information mining in remote sensing archives. The field of 
‘remote sensing’ somewhat predates the ‘Internet of Things’, 
but is in some ways a model for how information synthesis 
from devices on the Internet might operate. In this case, the 
devices are various cameras, resulting in databases of images.  
In this work, a three stage method is reported. Primitive 
image features and meta-features are extracted, by clustering 
these features an image vocabulary is extracted and finally 
Bayesian techniques are used to attach user-defined semantics 
to these vocabulary terms. By this means, the system learns via 
an interactive process the means to search very large databases 
for features deemed to have some semantic inference by the 
human user. It is easy to see how similar techniques could be 
employed for more general sensor data (if only because 
humans will often interpret data from such sensors by 
graphing) potentially resulting in identification of trends and 
patterns occurring in many world-wide phenomena, in fact 
anything that could be tracked using the devices associated 
with the Internet of Things. In the next section, we discuss a 
more specific case of an application designed around 
information mining on the Internet of Things. 
III. RFID FROM FARM TO FORK – AN EXAMPLE OF 
COLLABORATIVE INFORMATION MINING 
The RFID from Farm to Fork project is discussed by 
Cuinas et. al. [6]. The aim of the project was to allow consumer 
visibility of the production history and handling conditions in 
the supply chain. In order to allow this to happen, food 
manufacturers tracked their production process using a 
combination of AIDC and sensing technology. The AIDC 
technology was based around 1-D and 2-D barcodes, QR 
(Quick Response) codes and RFID or a mixture, according to 
the specific requirements in the manufacturing context. The 
sensing technology ranged from simple temperature sensors in 
the cold chain to wireless sensor networks monitoring growing 
conditions in vineyards. All of this information was formatted 
according to GS1 EPCIS (Electronic Product Code Information 
Services) concepts [7], in most cases using the open source 
Fosstrack implementation of EPCIS Repository as well as 
Query and Capture clients. The EPCIS standard assigns 
uniform resource identifiers (URIs) to individual assets, which 
is a globally unique name including a uniform resource locator, 
which can be used to locate the ‘location’ of the information on 
the World Wide Web. 
A consumer on purchasing a product scans a QR code, 
Datamatrix or NFC tag, which provides the URI of the product 
just bought. This is a serialized URI, which may identify the 
specific product, delivery or production batch, depending on 
the traceability requirements of the product manufacturer. As 
often as not, this depends on the value of the item concerned. 
The query proceeds as follows. First the URL in the product 
URI is used to access the EPCIS repository at that location, 
which returns the information available for that product, which 
might include production dates, temperature logs, other sensor 
data and URIs for the ingredients. In turn, the product 
databases corresponding to those URIs are accessed and the 
product history of the ingredients retrieved. Proceeding in this 
way, the traceability process in the supply chain provides the 
entire history of the product and all of its ingredients can be 
discovered, hence the project title ‘from Farm to Fork’. The 
user interface to this information is a custom website for that 
product, which is generated in real time by an application 
called ‘Identity Explorer’, and thus is usable on any device 
(smart phone) which can run a web browser. If the device also 
includes a camera (to scan QR code or read a Datamatrix) or 
NFC reader, then it is able to display all the available product 
information on that product. Availability of that information 
depends on the willingness of its owner to make it available on 
the open Internet, where the Identity Explorer can find it. There 
are many reasons why commercial concerns, such as food 
manufacturers, might wish to keep their production information 
confidential. These include maintenance of trade secrets, a 
concern that data mining of this information might reveal 
information on their business that they do not want to release 
and a feeling that revealing information openly poses some 
kind of unidentified threat. 
To counteract these concerns, it was necessary to provide 
the participants with some real business advantage that accrued 
from the release of the information. In the case of the food 
industry, which has been affected by a number of scares 
concerning the authenticity and origin of foodstuffs, that 
advantage was increased marketability of their product. The 
presentation of full traceability information to the consumer 
provides a large increase in consumer confidence and increases 
the saleability of the product. This was particularly pronounced 
for manufacturers of premium products, since it provided a 
means of clearly demonstrating that they were using superior 
ingredients and particular manufacturing processes. 
Having provided a business case for exposing the data, it 
was necessary to provide reassurance that only the data that the 
manufacturers wanted released was accessed in the EPCIS. The 
information had been sourced in a variety of ways. Some of the 
larger manufacturers involved already ran processes with full 
traceability and extensive use of sensor equipment in the 
manufacturing process. In this case, all that was necessary was 
to select the data required for consumer traceability and 
perform a translation to the required EPCIS formats if 
necessary. With some smaller manufacturers traceability and 
process tracking was done entirely with paper based systems. 
While it would have been possible to transpose the data from 
those systems to an EPCIS server, the practice was to provide 
automatic tracing and sensing by installing some economical 
AIDC and sensing systems, which interfaced directly to the 
EPCIS system. 
We argue that the RFID from Farm to Fork system was part 
of the Internet of Things, in that AIDC and sensor data was 
available directly on the Internet and that it was an example of 
information mining, in that it involved the real-time assembly 
of information from many services, with that information 
gathering being performed automatically. However, as an 
information mining application it was atypical, relying on data 
from organisations which had agreed in advance to make a 
subset of their production data available for the specific 
purpose of providing traceability, working with the system 
designers to determine which data was to be revealed and 
uploading that data to specialized servers, rather than allowing 
their working databases to be mined. 
This contrasts with more usual instances of data mining, 
where those performing the mining decide what they will do 
with the data, and devise strategies using search engines to 
trawl the Internet for suitable data. If there were not data 
owners making their datasets available on the open Web, such 
strategies simply would not work. We suggest therefore that if 
the value of information mining the Internet of Things is to be 
realised that the owners of the data to be mined must have a 
way to gain the same kind of confidence in the use of their data 
that those taking part in the RFID-F2F project did. This can be 
summarized as follows: 
• They should be able to gain some benefit from the use 
of their data. 
• They should have some control over who uses their data 
and for what purpose. 
• It should be possible to maintain control of the data, for 
instance in some cases it may be necessary to 
anonymise data. 
To this end, we propose that Internet of Things 
architectures need to be expanded to include a layer that 
specifically deals with these concerns, a digital rights 
management layer implemented as part of the Internet of 
Services that connects things and people.   
IV. SECURITY CONCERNS 
Security applied to the Internet of Things is an active strand 
of research. In his study of research directions for the Internet 
of Things, Stankovich identifies security as a major concern 
[8]. The IoT was identified as being vulnerable due the 
physical accessibility to sensors, actuators and objects, and the 
openness of the system. However, the physical accessibility is 
a particular concern of ‘things’ in general, and not a matter of 
their connection to the Internet. Roman et. al, provide an 
overview of security concerns in the Internet of Things, 
covering concerns including classical data security, but also the 
issues of privacy and identity [9]. They note that:  
The IoT’s highly distributed nature and use of fragile 
technologies, such as limited-function embedded devices in 
public areas, create weak links that malicious entities can 
exploit. Easily accessible objects in unprotected zones, such 
as city streets, are vulnerable to physical harm. Like 
compromising botnets, some objects would try to hinder 
services from the inside. Additional threats include the 
existence of a domino effect between intertwined services 
and user profiling through data collection and other 
methods. 
Discussing the matter of privacy, they identify the potential 
for attacks on the IoT to yield personal information: 
Privacy is one of the most sensitive subjects in any 
discussion of IoT protection. The data availability 
explosion has created Big Brother-like entities that profile 
and track users without their consent. The IoT’s anywhere, 
anything, anytime nature could easily turn such practices 
into a dystopia. Users would have access to an 
unprecedented number of personalized services, all of 
which would generate considerable data, and the 
environment itself would be able to acquire information 
about users automatically. 
The question of identity and ownership of data was a key 
concern in the RFID-F2F project, but is rarely considered in 
great detail in the literature of IoT security and privacy. 
Roman, et. al., do however put some thought into this, 
particularly introducing the notion of ‘identity shadowing’, in 
which ‘a user projects his virtual identity onto logical nodes’. 
From the point of view of this study, we would interpret that as 
proposing that the owner of the nodes is the owner of the data, 
and takes the rights and responsibilities for that data, which 
flow from that ownership. It is not legally a formal copyright 
situation, but may be to some extent covered under EU 
database rights [10]. 
One way of classifying attacks is by the method of attack 
Kopetz  classified various security attacks that can be as [11]: 
• Malicious attack: Where an adversary inserts malicious 
code. 
• Spoofing attack: the adversary masquerade as a 
legitimate user in order to gain unauthorized access to 
a system. 
• Password attack: The password of the system is been 
guessed. There are two versions of this kind of attack. 
Dictionary attacks and brute force attacks. 
• Cipher-Text attacks: The attacker assumes to have 
access to the cipher text and tries to deduce the plain 
text and possibly the encryption key from the cipher 
text. 
• Denial of Service attacks: The attack tries to make a 
computer system unavailable to its users by jamming 
the network. 
• Botnet attack; a set of infected networked nodes like 
thousands of PC’s that are under the control of an 
attacker.  
Given the exposure that has been given to this kind of 
concern, it is not surprising that many owners of device 
networks are concerned about the protection of their security. 
Taking this into account, in addition to the commercial 
concerns discussed above, it is understandable that there is 
considerable reluctance to make the data for networks of 
devices available on the open Internet. We propose that 
standard architectures for the IoT should include a service layer 
for rights management to be placed between network and 
application layer. 
V. AUTOMATIC RIGHTS MANAGEMENT FOR THINGS 
The deliverables of the EU Framework 7 project ‘Internet 
of Things – Architecture’ [12] produced a complete 
architectural framework for the Internet of Things. One of the 
major concerns addressed, given its own separate deliverable 
was ‘Privacy and Security’ [13]. In the executive summary, the 
importance of these matters is stressed: 
Security is an important cornerstone for the Internet of 
Things (IoT). More specific, all common aspects of security 
must be regarded. With the huge amount of data created by 
IoTs, integrity of data and trust in the services offering the 
data is crucial. Further, to protect important data and user 
interests, confidentiality of data and privacy of users must 
be ensured. In addition to integrity and confidentiality, 
each request and response inside the 
IoT has to be authenticated in a proper and secure way. 
The stress is on stopping unauthorised access, rather than 
finding means of providing the widest authorised access 
compatible with the need to address security and privacy. 
In their motivation for the need for a semantic layer within 
the Internet of Things, Barnaghi et. al. [5] discuss the various 
functions that will be required to enable widespread use of 
information mining type functions on the Internet of Things, 
including semantics for interoperability, IoT data integration, 
IoT data abstraction and access, Resource/service search and 
discovery. This is beginning to acknowledge that 
discoverability is a major concern for an effective use of IoT. 
Consequently, in recent times there has been some interest in 
cataloguing services, such as HyperCAT [14], which provide 
for discovering IoT resources. HyperCAT provides a means for 
resource owners to make their resources discoverable by listing 
them in an open catalogue. However, it does not address the 
motivation for having them discoverable. On the basis of our 
experience with RFID-F2F, we believe that resource owners 
will require the following reassurances: 
1. That they will receive some benefit for making their 
resources discoverable. 
2. That they will be able to separate data that is 
discoverable from that that isn’t and provide secure 
protection for the latter. 
3. That they may wish to restrict the community by 
whom this information is discoverable. 
On the basis of the concerns detailed in the IoT-A 
deliverables, particularly to do with privacy: 
4. That it must be possible when required to process the 
data in order to anonymise it, that is to ensure that data 
processing cannot reveal confidential data on 
individuals or organisations from this data. 
Also of importance is the manner of operation of such an 
architectural component. Information mining would lose much 
of its power if it was necessary for each transaction in the 
search to be individually negotiated with the data owner. For 
this reason, the decisions on whether or not to grant access to a 
search need to be performed automatically which in turn 
necessitates that the data owner has predetermined the access 
criteria. The rights management system then becomes a 
semantic issue, classifying the enquirer into one of the 
permitted classes, and making decisions on which rights to 
grant and whether there needs to be any remuneration. 
We foresee the operation of the rights management layer as 
follows. 
A. Benefit 
In the field of open source software and ‘creative 
commons’ media, there is frequently a layered model of access 
rights. That is, free access is offered to some classes of user 
(very often non-commercial), with different terms, including 
payment, required for commercial use. We would envisage that 
the IoT-RM solution for IoT data would need to follow a 
similar layered approach, most probably and most easily based 
on some standardised licence models similar to the ‘Creative 
Commons’ licences. In the case for which remuneration was 
required, there would need to be a mechanism for funds 
transfer built into the search mechanism. We could also 
speculate that, similar to the wider Internet, there may be 
alternative models for ‘monetisation’, including advertising 
and affiliation. 
B. Security of undiscoverable data. 
As discussed above, security remains a prime concern for 
thing owners, however speculative the security threats. In a 
scenario where access decisions concerning all or some of the 
data are being made automatically, there needs to be 
confidence that the data and systems to which access is not 
being granted remain secure. Given that much of the security 
measures proposed involve encryption of some kind, we could 
suggest that the solution to this problem might be selective or 
layered encryption, that is, that the data be encrypted in a 
layered manner (also known as multiple encryption) with 
different keys associated with different kinds of access 
permission. This is an approach already used in automatic 
image rights management [16] and is core to the ‘Onion 
Router’ [17]. 
C. Identifying the searcher’s community 
The question of identifying searchers to whom access of all 
or part of the data should be allowed maybe much more 
complex than is common in simple media rights management. 
For example, many sensor webs will fall into protected 
categories under various states security legislation, such as the 
USA’s National Security Laws [18]. This type of resource will 
yield a great deal of useful information to many scientific 
surveys, so a great deal of the value of the IoT would be lost if 
they were denied under the proposed mechanism to those who 
were authorised to use them. Generally the legal principle is 
that users of the data must request and be authorised in 
advance, but it is in the nature of automated web searches that 
there is no ‘in advance’ so far as the human operator is 
concerned. Thus, it must be possible for the identity and 
authority of the searcher to be determined reliably and quickly 
within the context of an automatic protocol. It can be imagined 
that national security agencies would demand a high degree of 
reliability from such a service, and this this would seem to be 
an area requiring ongoing research. 
D. Anonymisation 
The requirement for anonymisation really stems from the 
requirement to respect privacy. Often, it is proposed that AIDC 
data will constitute a direct privacy threat, though in truth it is 
only that AIDC data which directly identifies individuals that 
does so. More problematic is the possibility of inferred identity, 
relating from data fusion across different data sets, which 
might come from different data owners. The problem with 
ruling out access to some types of data on the basis of privacy 
is that this also negates some of the power of web information 
mining. For example, it is not hard to see than some very large 
and detailed epidemiological studies could be made by web 
searches of such things as environmental and pollution sensing 
networks and fusion of that data with health records. If too 
simplistic a model of privacy protection is taken than such 
studies would become difficult or impossible. Therefore, we 
suggest that necessary research should begin to develop a 
layered model for privacy protection of individuals that will 
allow the release of information, properly anonymised, to allow 
this type of search. The model would need to take into account 
the possibility of inferred identity as well as direct revelation of 
identity. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this paper we have argued the need for IoT architectures 
to include a layer of automatic rights management 
implemented as IoT-RM and that the full potential of the 
Internet of Things, as envisaged by Ashton and other, will not 
be fulfilled without this. We have also found that the need for 
this component has not featured in previous studies of IoT 
architectures or proposals for them, including that from the 
IoT-A project, Framework 7’s major effort at IoT model 
normalisation. We therefore propose that the IoT community 
include and adopt this as an important line of research in the 
coming period when organisations and industry are concerned. 
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